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Abstract
The extent to which an agent trusts another naturally depends on the outcomes of
their interactions. Previous computational approaches have treated the outcomes in a
domain-specific way. Specifically, these approaches focus on the mathematical aspect
and assume that a positive or negative experience can be identified without showing
how to ground the experiences in real-world interactions, such as emails and chats. We
propose Güven, an approach that relates trust to the domain-independent notion of
commitments. We consider commitments since commitment outcomes can be
associated with experiences and a large body of works exist on commitments that
include commitment representation and semantics. Also, recent research shows that
commitments can be extracted from interactions, such as emails and chats. Thus, we
posit Güven can provide an useful basis to infer trust between agents from their
interactions.
To evaluate Güven, we conducted empirical studies of two decision contexts. First,
subjects read emails extracted from the Enron dataset (and augmented with some
synthetic emails for completeness), and estimated trust between each pair of
communicating agents. Second, the subjects played the Colored Trails game,
estimating trust in their opponents. Güven incorporates a probabilistic model for trust
based on commitment outcomes; we show how to train its parameters for each
subject based on the subject’s assessments. The results are promising, though
imperfect. Our main contribution is to launch a research program into computing trust
based on a semantically well-founded account of interpersonal interactions.
Keywords: Multiagent systems, Commitments, Trust
Introduction
We consider multiagent system settings where agents interact with each other. A multi-
agent system is an open system consisting of autonomous and heterogeneous parties or
agents. By autonomy, we mean that agents can act independently. And, by heterogeneity,
we mean agents have diverse internal representations, including goals and internal poli-
cies. We consider a multiagent system to be open: agents may potentially enter such a
system interact with others, and leave the system. Real-world examples of such systems
arise in the corporate and military sectors where agents collaborate with each other in
teams. In such systems, based on their mutual interactions, an agent as a truster esti-
mates (and continually revises) its trust for another agent as a trustee. For example, in a
corporate setting, an employer (truster) can assign a task to an employee (trustee). If the
employee performs the task, the employer’s trust increases for its employee. Similarly, in
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the military, a commander (truster) can ask a subordinate (trustee) to destroy a particu-
lar target. If the subordinate success, the trust of the commander toward the subordinate
presumably increases.
Understanding such interactions between agents and estimating trust from them is an
interesting and challenging topic. Scissors et al. [1] exploit linguistic similarity in chat
messages to estimate trust between message senders and receivers. Adalı et al. [2] cal-
culate relationship strength between two users in Twitter based on social and behavioral
aspects such as their numbers of friends and followers, the number of messages they
exchange, and the time delay between the messages exchanged. DuBois et al. [3] provide
an algorithm to compute trust and distrust in a social network. Wang et al. [4] combine
positive and negative evidence to estimate trust. Teacy et al. [5] formulate trust as the
count of fulfilling or violating obligations. Jøsang [6] represents trust as the belief mea-
sure of a truster that the trustee will cooperate. The above approaches are promising but
they are limited to numerical heuristics. Such approaches have been justifiably criticized
by richer approaches [7–9] for missing the essential intuitive considerations of trust, e.g.,
regarding the autonomy of the participants and the vulnerability of the truster to deci-
sions by the trustee. The truster’s vulnerability refers to his or her willingness to take a
risk on the trustee with the expectation that the trustee will perform the task promised
to the truster [10]. However, the richer approaches have limitations since although they
are formally represented, they do not lend themselves to computational techniques that
could be applied in practice.
We seek to bridge the above gap between theory and practice. Specifically, we propose
Güven,1 a computational model of trust founded on commitments that supports how
agents determine trust in others based on their interactions. Commitments are impor-
tant for trust because they can be identified from interpersonal interactions and can help
us characterize the outcomes of such interactions in high-level terms. We limit Güven
to commitments, although it can be potentially extended to related concepts such as
prohibitions and authorizations.
A commitment C(debtor, creditor, antecedent, consequent) means that the debtor com-
mits to bringing about the consequent for the creditor provided the antecedent holds.
For example, C(Buck, Selia, deliver, pay) means that Buck (buyer) commits to Selia (seller)
to paying a specified amount provided Selia delivers the goods. When Selia delivers,
the commitment is detached. When Buck pays, the commitment is discharged or sat-
isfied. If Selia delivers but Buck does not pay, the commitment is violated. In essence,
a commitment describes a social relationship between two persons giving a high-level
description of what one expects of the other. As a result, it is natural that commitments
(and their satisfaction or violation) be useful as a basis for trust. In the above example,
if Buck discharges the commitment, he brings a positive experience to Selia and Selia’s
trust for Buck may increase; if Buck violates the commitment, he brings a negative expe-
rience to Selia and Selia’s trust for Buck may decrease. Figure 1 illustrates the intuition
graphically.
Despite the apparent match, few approaches relate trust and commitments. Singh [9]
and Chopra et al. [8] relate trust and commitments in terms of logical postulates and
from an architectural perspective. In contrast, we understand trust and commitment in
probabilistic terms, considering the outcomes of specific commitments and their effect
on the trust relationships between the concerned parties.
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Fig. 1 Trust updates based on a commitment progression
We conduct two empirical evaluations, respectively, on emails (automatically analyzed
using Kalia et al.’s approach [11]) and via the Colored Trails cooperation game [12]
(analyzed manually). We show how to train the model parameters so as to capture a
user model indicating each user’s propensity to trust given commitment outcomes. Our
evaluations yield promising, though imperfect, results on the viability of inferring trust
from the commitments arising in interactions, suggesting the need for better extraction
techniques. Our main contribution is to show how trust can be computed via the domain-
independent concept of commitments. The contribution takes a step further to bring
existing theories into practice.
This paper is organized as follows. We begin with a review of the related work. Next,
we provide essential background on commitments and intuitions regarding how commit-
ments affect trust. Then, we describe Güven as an evidence-based approach for updating
trust based on commitments along with the requisite computational methods.We present
our hypotheses in informal terms along with a strategy for evaluating them, followed by
our evaluation and results. We conclude with a discussion and future directions.
Related work
Teacy et al. [5] provide a trust model based on fulfilling or violating obligations. In their
model, the trust of a truster (atr) toward a trustee (ate) is represented as the expected




given the outcome of all
interactions O1:tatr ,ate ) between the truster and the trustee. In contrast to their work, we
consider representing trust as the basis of commitments (instead of obligations). We con-
sider commitments since there has been an extensive work on capturing and formalizing
the semantics of commitments in multiagent interactions [13, 14]. In addition, the life-
cycle of commitments [15, 16] describe how commitments are created and progressed in
multiagent interactions. Further, we evaluate our models on an email and a game dataset
proving that such models are applicable to real-world settings.
Wang et al. [4] define trust (α) as the ratio of positive outcomes experienced (r) by the
truster from the trustee to the total number of positive and negative outcomes(s), i.e.,
α = rr+s . Further, to denote the certainty of the truster toward a trustee, Wang et al. [4]
define a certainty function (c(r, s)) that employs a beta distribution and takes r and s as
its input parameters. There are important limitations with Wang et al. [4] contributions:
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(1) the model is purely mathematical and hence, does not clearly describe how it can be
applied to real-life interactions such as emails and chats. Specifically, the definitions of
positive and negative outcomes are not formally captured with respect to agents’ inter-
actions; (2) the model needs the initial trust to be manually set. That is, it assumes fixed
values. Specifically, Wang et al. mention that the initial trust is set based on the truster’s
prior experience with the trustee. Compared to their model, we clearly define positive
and negative evidence as outcomes of commitments thereby extending their model to be
applicable to real-world settings. Further, our model learns the initial trust from users’
data instead of assuming fixed values.
Osman et al. [17] describe a model that estimates the trust of a truster based on the
trustee’s capability and willingness to execute a commitment. The willingness of a trustee
to execute the commitment is computed using the trustee’s past behavior in executing
similar commitments. The capability of the trustee is computed by matching the capa-
bility needed for the current commitment with the capabilities of the trustee observed
in the past. Osman et al.’s model suffers from two important limitations: First, the model
considers commitments as a set of actions to be performed by the trustee, thus omitting
a formal representation as well as an operationalization (lifecycle) of commitments. This
makes the model less intuitive with respect to its applicability on real-world data such as
emails. Second, similar to Wang et al.’s [4] model, Osman et al.’s trust model needs the
initial trust to be manually set. For example, the model considers the initial trust as zero
which may not hold in different settings.
Kastidou et al. [18] describe a trust model based on promises made and delivered by a
trustee toward a truster. Similar to Osman et al. [17] model, Kastidou et al.’s model does
not provide the semantics of promises, requires manual setting of the initial trust values,
and does not consider real-world datasets for the evaluation.
Burnett and Oren [19] examine the effects of delegation using a probabilistic trust
model [20] and propose an approach for weighting trust updates based on shared respon-
sibility or delegation. Burnett and Oren do not restrict the delegation chain length. In
contrast, we restrict our trust update to delegation chains of length three (the debtor,
the new debtor, and the creditor). For example, if the new debtor delegates the commit-
ment to another debtor (debtor’), trust between debtor and debtor’ remains unaffected.
This means if debtor’ satisfies or violates the commitment, the trust of the debtor toward
debtor’ neither increases or decreases, respectively, since the debtor still depends on the
new debtor to satisfy the commitment and may be ignorant of debtor’. We observe that
such longer chains are rare in a real-world text corpus.
Adalı et al. [2] correlate textual features (linguistics, processes, and psychological
processes) with social and behavioral features (reciprocity, assortativity, attention, and
latency). Textual features are derived based on the content of messages exchanged
between users whereas social and behavioral features are computed based on user’s social
network (nodes, edges). Both the textual and behavioral features are indicator of trust
behavior between users. However, such measures are considered based on their fre-
quency of occurrence and they do not not capture the vulnerability of a truster toward a
trustee. For example, textual features indicate number of verbs, pronouns, affective pro-
cesses (emotions), cognitive processes (causation, certainty), perceptual processes (see,
hear, feel), and so on whereas behavioral features indicate number of number of friends,
followers, messages sent, degree similarity between users, reciprocity of conversation and
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propagation messages, in-degree, out-degree and so on. Thus, we emphasize capturing
semantic meanings of messages in terms of commitments (i.e., how they are created,
satisfied, and violated) from the text content exchanged between users.
Scissors et al. [1] performed an empirical evaluation with 62 students and found that
different forms of linguistic similarity, such as content (e.g., positive emotion words,
task-related words), structure (e.g., verb tense, phrasal entrainment), and style (e.g., chat
abbreviations, emoticons) reflect different level of trust between participants. In contrast,
we consider commitments between participants to estimate trust between them.
Background on commitments
Figure 2 presents the commitment lifecycle we adopt. A commitment C(debtor, creditor,
antecedent, consequent) is created when a debtor either voluntarily creates it (commissive
creation) or is directed to do a certain task (directive creation). Given the debtor’s auton-
omy, the latter presumes a prior commitment on part of the debtor. A commitment is
detached if a condition or an antecedent present for a commitment holds true; discharged
when a debtor executes a committed task. A commitment is terminated when a debtor
cancels the commitment before it is detached or a creditor releases the commitment. A
commitment is violated when a debtor cancels the commitment after it is detached or
when a consequent timeout occurs. Additionally, a commitment can be delegated and
assigned. A commitment is delegated when the debtor of a commitment is replaced by a
new debtor and assignedwhen the creditor of a commitment is replaced by a new creditor.
We map interactions between persons to commitment operations.
Consider a commitment C(Alice, Bob, pay, ship goods) where Alice (buyer) commits to
Bob (seller) to ship goods provided Bob pays. When Alice offers Bob to ship the goods,
C gets created from Alice toward Bob and becomes conditional. When Bob makes the
payments, C gets detached. If Alice ships the goods, C gets discharged. If Alice does
not ship the goods despite the payment, C gets violated. If C is conditional and Alice
cancels C, C gets terminated. Alice can delegate C to a new agent Charlie to create
commitment C(Charlie, Bob, pay, ship goods) where Charlie becomes the new debtor.
Similarly, Bob can assign commitment C to a new creditor John to create C(Charlie,
John, pay, ship goods). In case of delegation and assignment, when a new commit-
ment are created, the older commitment remains suspended and its outcome depend
upon the outcome of the new commitment. If the new commitment is satisfied, so
Fig. 2 Commitment lifecycle [16]
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is the older commitment. If the new commitment is violated, the older commitment
becomes active (conditional or detached, depending upon the truth of its antecedent)
again.
Intuitions on trust and commitments
We describe some criteria for how trust values may be updated based on operations on
commitments.
Effects of commitment operations on trust
We describe the effect of commitment operations on trust. Before we describe the effects,
let us consider some situations wherein a commitment exists from a debtor toward a
creditor.
Effect of discharge. When a commitment is discharged, the creditor’s trust for the
debtor increases.
Effect of violation. When a commitment is violated, the creditor’s trust in the debtor
decreases.
Effect of delegation and discharge. When a commitment is delegated by the original
debtor to a new debtor, and the new debtor satisfies it, the creditor’s trust in both the
original and the new debtor increases.
Effect of delegation and violation.When a commitment is delegated from the original
debtor to a new debtor and the new debtor violates it, the creditor’s trust in both the
original and the new debtor decreases.
Effect of assignment and discharge.When the commitment is assigned from the orig-
inal creditor to a new creditor and the original debtor discharges it, the trust of the
original and new creditor for the original debtor increases.
Effect of assignment and violation.When the commitment is assigned from the origi-
nal creditor to the new creditor and the debtor violates it, the trust of the original and
the new creditor for the original debtor decreases.
We make the following assumptions regarding the increase or decrease of trust. These
are simplified assumptions and could be relaxed in some settings.
• In our basic approach (baseline), the change in trust is the same for all commitment
outcomes.We additionally provide an approach in which the change in trust depends
upon the strength of a commitment. For example, a commitment with a strict dead-
line when satisfied may produce a different level of trust compared to a commitment
with a flexible deadline.
• We assume commitment discharge and violation to be all or none; in our scenarios,
partial success is not easy to infer.
• In case of violation, the trust of the creditor for the debtor decreases irrespective of
whether the debtor was truly responsible. An agent’s beliefs and goals are private and
cannot be identified directly from his or her interactions.
• In case of delegation, the original creditor’s trust in the original and the new debtor
changes equally, reflecting the idea that the creditor has a positive experience thanks
to the two debtors.
In case of a situation where the new debtor violates a commitment and the original
debtor has nothing to do with it, it was still the responsibility of the original debtor to
satisfy the commitment. (This is one of the patterns of delegation identified by Singh
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et al. [21]). Thus, the creditor’s trust will decrease equally for both the new and the
original debtor.
• In case of assignment, the new creditor’s trust in the debtor changes as much as
the original creditor’s trust in the debtor, reflecting the intuition that both creditors’
expectations are met.
Subjectivity, memory, and strength
Trust is modulated by features that affect how trusters judge outcomes, such as the sat-
isfaction or violation of a commitment. First, trust assessment is subjective. Trusters
differ in how they reward or penalize a trustee when a commitment is discharged
or violated, respectively. Second, trust assessment depends on the truster’s memory:
trusters with limited memory would tend to forget all but (some varying number
of) recent experiences. Recent experiences may turn out to be more predictive of
future experiences (that trust is about) than past experiences. Third, the effect on
trust of a commitment’s outcome would be greater when the commitment is more
important.
Güven: model of trust based on commitments
We adopt Wang and Singh’s [22] trust model, which represents trust as evidence 〈r, s〉.
Here, r ≥ 0 and s ≥ 0 respectively represent the positive and negative experiences the
truster has with the trustee. Both r and s are real numbers.Wang and Singh calculate trust
as the probability of a positive outcome as α = rr+s . Suppose Buck and Selia transact 10
times and exactly eight transactions succeed from Selia’s perspective. Then Selia’s trust in
Buck would be 0.8.
The basic idea is for each truster to maintain evidence 〈r, s〉 about each trustee. The
initial evidence, 〈rin, sin〉, represents the truster’s bias. An interaction may yield a positive,
negative, or a neutral experience. In these cases, the evidence is updated by respectively
adding 〈ir , 0〉, 〈0, is〉, and 〈λir , (1 − λ)is〉, where λ ∈[0, 1]. In essence, we characterize each
truster via five parameters (ir , is, rin, sin, λ).
Considering subjectivity
To evaluate H1, we learn a specific truster’s parameters based on positive, negative, and
neutral experiences it acquires from trustees and the truster’s actual trust in various
trustees. For the kth trustee, let αk represent the truster’s actual trust (as revealed) and αˆk
the truster’s predicted trust in k. Let E+k , E
−
k , and Ek represent the numbers of positive,
negative, and neutral experiences, respectively. Then,
αˆk =
rin + E+k ir + λ · Ekir
rin + sin + E+k ir + E−k is + Ek(λir + (1 − λ)is)
(1)
Via nonlinear least-squares regression technique that uses trust region reflective
algorithm [23], we estimate the truster’s parameters to minimize the mean absolute error
(MAE) of prediction,
∑n
k=1 |αˆk − αk|.
Considering memory
We capture the effect of memory by considering a discount window [24], defined simply
as the most recent W experiences. Let n be the total number of experiences the truster
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acquires from the trustee. Let t = min(n,W ). Let E+t , Et , and E−t be the positive, neutral,
and negative experiences inferred from the t transactions. The trust of a truster in the
trustee depends on whether t is less than W. When t < W , the truster’s trust is 〈E+t ir +
λEtir , E−t is+(1−λ)Etis〉; otherwise, it is 〈rin+E+t ir+λEtir , sin+E−t is+(1−λ)Etis〉. When
t < W we ignore the initial bias as the truster’s trust is based on recent W experiences,
which simply means that the truster has already forgotten its initial bias.
Considering strength
We posit that a truster acquires experiences of varying weights based on commitment
outcomes (satisfied or violated). To calculate the weight, we identify the following features
in a sentence indicating a commitment creation.
Commissive over directive. A commissive (e.g., “I will . . . ”) may carry a greater weight
than a directive (e.g., “Could you please . . . ”) because it holds even without the
presumption of another commitment.
Debtor’s type. A single debtor may carry a greater weight than multiple debtors “we”
(“We will follow up”). A single debtor, as in “I will follow up,” has clearer responsibility
than multiple debtors.
Creditor’s type. Multiple creditors may carry a greater weight than a single creditor.
Multiple creditors arise when a debtor commits to a set, e.g., when a product manager
commits to his employees to review a product. The intuition is that having multiple
creditors makes the debtor accountable to more parties.
Modal verbs. Some modal verbs (e.g., will or shall) may convey high confidence over
others (e.g., can, could, may, would) [25]. The intuition is that “will” indicates that
a commitment will be surely satisfied whereas “can” indicates that the commitment
may not be satisfied. We learn the weights of different modal verbs based on data
obtained from human subjects.
Action verbs. Some action verbs convey a greater level of importance than others. For
example, “resolving an issue” may be more important than “reviewing a proposal.”
We compute the weights of verbs using Burchardt et al.’s [26] FrameNet tool, which
provides weights for words used in different senses, e.g., 1 for resolve and 0.383 for
review.
Deadlines. Noun phrases with deadlines [27] may convey more importance than noun
phrases without deadlines. For example, an explicit deadline, as in “I will repair the car
by Monday,” enhances the importance of the commitment. We assume that merely
mentioning a deadline increases the seriousness of a commitment. We defer to future
research additional subtleties, such as the duration or urgency of a deadline and
the extent to which it may be broken, since in our empirical settings durations and
urgency do not arise.
Except the feature action verb, we evaluate rest of the features empirically from a sub-
ject evaluation. We provide the outcome of our evaluation in Table 6. Our evaluation
ranks feature values as discussed above. We map the ranks to weights (cardinal num-
bers, higher for higher ranked features) and sum the weights to compute a value. For
example, consider two commitment creations from a trustee toward a truster: (1) “I will
repair the car by Monday” and (2) “I can repair the car”. These examples have four com-
mon features: the commitment type (commissive), the debtor type (“I”), the creditor type
(single), and the action verb (“repair”) and two different features: modal verbs (“will”
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versus “can”) and deadlines (“Monday” versus no deadline). Thus, based on the features
from these two examples and the rank of those features provided in Table 6, we compute
their weights as shown in Table 1. The weights computed (11 versus 8) indicate that the
truster might have a different experience from the outcome of the first example than the
second example.
Evaluation strategy
We consider two decision contexts for evaluations. The first context involves subjects (as
bystanders) reading emails exchanged between other agents and assessing the levels of
trust between these agents. The second context involves the subjects playing a game with
each other. The game has some cooperative and some competitive elements. The subjects
(as interested participants) assess the trustworthiness of their opponents.
We now present our research hypotheses in informal terms. These hypotheses are
based on subjectivity, memory, and strength, as proposed in Section ‘Güven: model of
trust based on commitments’ to compute trust. Thus, these hypotheses motivate our
evaluation strategy and study design. The following section on evaluation refines these
hypotheses into technical claims.
H1 (Subjectivity) Predicting trust values by learning trust parameters for each subject
yields more accurate results than using fixed trust parameters for all subjects.
The details of the trust parameters are given in Section ‘Güven: model of trust
based on commitments’. Assuming H1 holds, we consider learned parameters as
the baseline approach. We check if other approaches improve accuracy beyond the
baseline.
We considerH1 since trust models [4, 5, 17, 18] described in Section ‘Related work’
compute trust considering fixed parameters. That is, they consider fixed values for
〈r, s, rin, sin, λ〉. In contrast, we compute trust by learning these parameters from sub-
jects’ assigned level of trust. Thus, we posit that learning the trust parameters would
improve the trust prediction accuracy.
H2 (Memory) Predicting trust values by learning a specific discount window size for each
subject yields more accurate results than the baseline.
We consider H2 since a subject might assign a trust level based on his or her most
recent experiences [24]. Thus, we posit that learning a specific discount window
size in addition to learning trust parameters for each subject can improve the trust
prediction accuracy more than the baseline.
H3 (Strength) Predicting trust values by inferring strengths of positive and negative
experiences yields more accurate results than the baseline.
Table 1 Computing commitment weights for two examples of commitment creations
Features Example 1 Example 2
1. Commissive, Directive Commissive (2) Commissive (2)
2. Debtor’s type “I” (2) “I” (2)
3. Creditor’s type single (1) single (1)
4. Modal Verbs “will” (4) can (2)
5. Action Verbs “repair” (1) “repair” (1)
5. Deadlines “Monday” (1) no deadline (0)
Total Weight 11 8
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We consider H3 since a subject might assign a trust level based on his or her
varying experiences from different commitment outcomes. Thus, we posit that con-
sidering weights of such commitments in addition to learning trust parameters for
each subject can improve the trust prediction accuracy more than the baseline.
H4 Subjects’ trust assessment behavior as bystanders differs from their trust assessment
behaviors as players. H4 is measured in terms of the following subhypotheses, which
posit that subjects’ trust assessment behaviors vary across decision contexts.
H41 The correlation coefficients (R) between subjects’ trust values and positive
experiences in emails and the game, respectively, are different.
H42 The correlation coefficients (R) between subjects’ trust values and neutral
experiences in emails and the game, respectively, are different.
Evaluation process
Figure 3 summarizes our evaluation process. Our evaluation strategy is to gather data
from subjects in the two decision contexts and proceed as follows.
Step 1. Build a dataset of interpersonal interactions with trust values. For emails, sub-
jects provide third-party assessments; for games, subjects provide their own trust
assessments. Table 2 shows the examples of email and chat interactions. Based on
the emails exchanged between Kim and Dorothy, the subjects assign trust values in
the range of 0 and 1, from Kim toward Dorothy as well as from Dorothy toward Kim.
Similarly, for chats P1 assigns a trust value for P4 and P4 assigns a trust value for P1.
Step 2. Identify commitment operations from the interactions. For emails, using Kalia
et al.’s [11] trained classifier; for games, we find these in the chat interface and ana-
lyze them manually. Table 2 shows examples of commitment operations identified in
emails and chats, respectively.
Step 3. Partition the dataset into training and test datasets. Learn model parameters for
each subject from the training data.
Step 4.Apply the learnedmodel to predict trust in the test data and compute themodel’s
accuracy.
We repeat the process for all subjects and present our results.
Evaluation
We evaluated Güven via an empirical study with 30 subjects (graduate and undergrad-
uate students from various academic departments at our university). We conducted the
Fig. 3 Process for evaluation
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Table 2 Examples of email and chat interactions
Sender Receiver Email content Operation
Kim Dorothy I will also check with Alliance Travel Agency . . . create(C1)
Kim Dorothy I checked with our Travel Agency . . . discharge(C1)
Rob Kim ByWednesday Aug 16 2001, please send all copies of your documentation . . . create(C2)
Kim Rob Rob, please forgive me for not sending this in by Aug 15 cancel(C2)
Sender Receiver Chat content Operation
P1 P4 Can you please give 1 green tile?
P4 P1 I can create(C3)
P4 P1 P4 transferred P1 1 green tile discharge(C3)
study in two phases. In the first phase, subjects read 33 emails selected from the Enron
email corpus [28, 29] and provided a trust value ranging from 0 to 1 between the senders
and receivers of email. The emails were selected on the basis of their containing sentences
that indicate commitment creation, satisfaction, or violation—such sentences having been
identified using Kalia et al.’s [11] method. We augmented the dataset with 28 synthetic
sentences indicating commitment satisfaction or violation, which do not occur frequently
in the corpus. Subjects provided trust values based on their intuitions by reading these
emails. We did not disclose the commitments identified. We did not provide any addi-
tional guidelines that might restrict a subject’s individual perception of trust. Once the
subjects provided their estimated trust values, we mapped commitment operations to
positive, negative, and neutral experiences. Table 3 shows an example of two rows cre-
ated from the first two interactions between Kim and Dorothy given in Table 2. S1, . . . ,
S6 in Table 3 represent the subjects who provided trust values based on the interac-
tions between Kim and Dorothy. Based on the experiences collected from emails and
trust values collected from subjects, we created 28 rows of data for each subject. Hence,
for 30 subjects we obtain 28×30 or 840 rows. We provide additional details of our data,
including a link to download it, in the Appendix (in Section ‘Data’).
Additionally, we asked subjects several questions based on the features discussed
in Section ‘Considering strength’. The questions were about ranking these features in
order of their perceived importance. We provide these questions in the Appendix in
Section ‘Questionnaires’. Hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 are about evaluating the proposed
approaches with respect to their prediction accuracy.
For the second phase, we augmented Gal et al.’s [12] Colored Trails game with a chat
interface. Each subject played three games of five rounds each. Figure 4 shows an instance
of the game in progress. The game has a 4×4 board with a chat interface to communicate
with one’s opponent. In each round, subjects were allocated a fixed number of colored
tiles, a starting position, and a common goal position on the board. To reach the goal, a
subject must provide the requisite tiles. During the game, subjects can communicate and
Table 3 Different features and trust values from different subjects
Trust pairs Experiences S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6
Kim→Dorothy 2 Neutral, 0 Positive, 0 Negative 0.3 0.4 0.35 0.5 0.6 0.7
Dorothy→Kim 1 Neutral, 1 Positive, 0 Negative 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.95
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Fig. 4 A screenshot of the Colored Trails game
trade tiles via the chat interface. A subject could commit to an opponent to transfer spec-
ified tiles and could discharge or violate each commitment. After each round, subjects
recorded their trust for their opponents on a five-point scale.
We randomly split our 30 subjects into five groups of six each, and each group into
two subgroups of three subjects each. The players in any game sat in separate rooms and
communicated through the chat tool. The subjects did not know the identities of the
other subjects but knew they had the same opponent for all three rounds of each game.
Hypotheses H4, H41, and H42 are about evaluating whether a subject’s estimation profile
differs across decision-making contexts.
Results
[VerifyingH1]We collected the trust values from the subjects from the emails assigned to
them. We divided the data collected from subjects into three-fold training and test data
and learned trust parameters for each subject (rin, sin, ir , is, λ) that minimize the mean
absolute error (MAE) between predicted and actual trust values.
For verifying H1, we calculated the MAE for λ ranging from 0.1 to 0.9. Then, we cal-
culated the MAE by learning the λ (Learned(λ)) itself. Based on the above MAEs, we
obtained a customized λ (fixed or learned) for each subject. A customized λ for a subject
refers to the value of λ for which the MAE is minimum.We represent the MAEs obtained
using customized λs for all subjects as Custom(λ) in Fig. 5. Finally, we arbitrarily assumed
some fixed configurations of parameters (F1 = 〈1, 1, 1, 1, 0.5〉, F2 = 〈2, 1, 1, 1, 0.5〉,
F3= 〈1, 2, 1, 1, 0.5〉). F1 indicates no bias in the initial trust perception where as F2 and F3
indicate positive and negative biases respectively. λ=0.5 in fixed configurations indicates
equal trust increments for the neutral experiences. The configurations can be changed
by incrementing or decrementing different parameters. From the results, we observed
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Fig. 5 MAE for predicting trust values
that the median of Custom(λ) (0.162) is less than the medians of all other approaches. To
verify if the difference is significant, we evaluated hypothesis H1 via one-tailed t-test as
shown in Table 4. From the results, we found that the difference is not statistically signifi-
cant. Thus, we concluded that although the overall result (MAEs) seems to align with the
hypothesis H1, i.e., learning the trust parameters yields more accurate results than using
fixed parameters for all subjects, the significance result doesn’t confirm it. We leave the
evaluation of H1 for further investigation.
[Verifying H2] For verifying H2, first, we determined customized window sizes
(CW = 1, 2, . . . , 12) for each subject for all the values of λ (0.1, . . . , 0.9, learned
λ). A customized window size (CW) for a subject refers to the value of CW for
which the MAE is minimum. We found that if we increase the window size fur-
ther (i.e., greater than 12), the MAEs for the subjects do not decrease. We obtained
MAEs for all the subjects based on various values of λ and CWs, and represent
them as Custom(λ)+CW shown in Fig. 6. We compared Custom(λ)+CW with
Custom(λ) obtained from H1 and MAEs obtained from other approaches. From
the results, we found that the median of Custom(λ)+CW (0.153) is less than the
median of Custom(λ) (0.162) and other approaches. From the one-tailed t-test results
shown in Table 5, we found that the mean of Custom(λ)+CW is significantly lower
than the means of approaches that consider fixed configurations (e.g., λ=0.7+CW).
However, for others, the t-test results show that the differences are not significant. Thus,
we concluded that although the overall result (MAEs) seems to align with the hypoth-
esis H2, i.e., learning a specific discount window size yields more accurate results than
Table 4 Statistical test results for H1
μC(λ) < μothers μC(λ) μothers p-value
μC(λ) < μF3 0.18 0.21 0.14
μC(λ) < μF2 0.18 0.20 0.18
μC(λ) < μF1 0.18 0.21 0.07
μC(λ) < μL(λ) 0.18 0.19 0.34
μC(λ) < μλ=0.9 0.18 0.19 0.36
μC(λ) < μλ=0.7 0.18 0.19 0.34
μC(λ) < μλ=0.5 0.18 0.19 0.33
μC(λ) < μλ=0.3 0.18 0.19 0.34
(μ-mean of the MAEs)
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Fig. 6 Results comparing different window sizes to predict trust values
the baseline, the significance result doesn’t confirm it. We leave the evaluation of H2 for
further investigation.
[Verifying H3] From the first phase of our experiment, we obtained subjects’ assess-
ments of the weights of commitments. From their assessment we obtained different
orderings among the feature values shown in Table 6. The ordering among the values for
the creditor type shows that our initial assumption about it was incorrect. For the rest of
the feature values, our assumptions correctly aligned with the subjects’ assessments.
From the orderings shown in Table 6 we calculated a weight for each commit-
ment (CWT). Based on the weights, we recalculated trust parameters using dif-
ferent λs, namely, (0.1, . . . , 0.9, learned λ). For H3, we calculated a customized λ
(Custom(λ)+CWT) and compared the results with C(λ) from H1. From the results
shown in Fig. 7, we found that the median of Custom(λ)+CWT (0.161) is slightly less
than the median of Custom(λ) (0.162). CWT in the figure means considering com-
mitment weight. From the one-tailed t-test results shown in Table 7, the mean of
Custom(λ)+CWT is not significantly lower than the means of other approaches. Thus,
we concluded that although the overall result (MAEs) seems to align with the hypothe-
sis H3, i.e., inferring strengths of positive and negative experiences yields more accurate
results than the baseline, the significance result doesn’t confirm it.We leave the evaluation
of H3 for further investigation.
[Verifying H4] We verified the subhypotheses H41 and H42 via two-tailed tests at the
alpha level of 0.05. For both of them, there are no significant differences between the
means of the correlation coefficient (R) obtained from the emails and the game, respec-
tively (H41: p-value = 0.32, H42: p-value = 0.19). Therefore, subjects’ trust assessment
behaviors in emails and in games are not different, thereby rejecting Hypothesis H4.
Discussion
Our main contribution is a computational approach for trust that overlays a domain-
independent concept describing the social relationships and outcomes of interpersonal
Table 5 Statistical test results for H2
μC(λ)+ CW < μothers μC(λ)+ CW μothers p-value
μC(λ)+ CW < μλ=0.7+CW=1 0.17 0.27 0.00
μC(λ)+ CW < μλ=0.9+CW=12 0.17 0.20 0.08
μC(λ)+ CW < μC(λ) 0.17 0.18 0.27
μC(λ)+ CW < μL(λ)+CW 0.17 0.18 0.32
μC(λ)+ CW < μλ=0.9+CW 0.17 0.19 0.17
μC(λ)+ CW < μλ=0.7+CW 0.17 0.18 0.30
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Table 6 Ordering among the feature values obtained from subjects’ assessments
Features Ordering
1. Commissive, Directive Commissive (2) >Directive (1)
2. Debtor’s type “I” (2) >“We” (1)
3. Creditor’s type multiple creditor (2) >single creditor (1)
4. Modal Verbs “must, will” (4) >“would, should, shall” (3) >“can, could” (2) >“may” (1)
5. Deadlines messages with “deadline” (2) >messages without “deadline” (1)
interactions. Previous theoretical approaches, both cognitive [7] and architectural [8, 9],
have considered rich concepts but they are not easy to be used as bases for computing
trust in the field. By contrast, previous computational approaches have largely worked in
an ad hoc manner that bind the trust reasoning to a particular domain.
For the email dataset, comparing the means of the MAEs, our approach yields a cor-
relation between subjects’ intuitions regarding trust values and those computationally
predicted values. Discounting windows customized for each subject yield improved pre-
dictions. Considering commitment weights improves predictions further, though not
significantly. We additionally evaluate if subjects trust assessment behavior varies across
two decision contexts, namely, as bystanders (reading emails exchanged between agents)
and as game players (playing the Colored Trails game with opponents that involves
competitive as well as cooperative elements). From the t-test results, we find that both
hypotheses (H41 and H42) are rejected thereby suggesting that subjects’ trust assessment
behaviors in emails and in games do not vary.
The limitation of our results may be due to the following reasons: (1) lack of adequate
data and (2) a greater fraction of experiences being judged neutral than positive or nega-
tive. Also, we lack an existing approach to compare our results. However, we submit that
our contribution is valuable for having launched a new research direction on computa-
tional techniques unifying trust and commitments. Publishing imperfect results, as in this
submission, might serve as an antidote to a systematic bias in academic research to favor
“success stories” over accurate reporting of empirical results, a bias that is increasingly
decried in the scientific disciplines, e.g., [30, 31].
Future directions
First, our dataset is not large. A challenge we faced was motivating subjects to provide
trust values truthfully for a larger dataset.
Second, our work is limited to predicting trust updates and ignores certainty. According
to Wang et al. [4] certainty is the measure of confidence that a truster places in a trustee
Fig. 7 Incorporating commitment weights reduces MAE
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Table 7 Statistical test results for H3
μC(λ)+ CWT < μothers μC(λ)+ CWT μothers p-value
μC(λ)+ CW < μC(λ) 0.18 0.18 0.50
μC(λ)+ CW < μL(λ)+CWT 0.18 0.19 0.37
μC(λ)+ CW < μλ=0.9+CWT 0.18 0.19 0.40
μC(λ)+ CW < μλ=0.7+CWT 0.18 0.19 0.34
μC(λ)+ CW < μλ=0.5+CWT 0.18 0.19 0.32
based on its experiences with the trustee. A truster’s certainty increases with increasing
number of consistent experiences of the truster with the trustee. Thus, certainty is cru-
cial to trust. However, it is difficult to elicit certainty from subjects since certainty may
be more subjective than even trust. A more careful social science style qualitative inves-
tigation, as suggested by a reviewer, may be appropriate. In the future, we plan to address
these limitations by adopting an incentive scheme that motivates subjects to provide trust
values truthfully.
Third, we plan to extend our model to Hidden Markov Models (HMM) [32, 33] that
incorporate the temporal aspect of trust, i.e., an agent’s current trust is computed based
on its past trust. For the same, we will motivate subjects to provide intermittent trust
labels by reading emails.
Fourth, there is no reason to be limited to commitments: indeed, we have begun work
on bringing in cognitive aspects such as goals and emotions, suitably elicited from sub-
jects, as a basis for creating commitments and judging commitment outcomes and overall
trust.
Fifth, a subtle potential benefit of our approach is that it seeks to understand com-
munications and can thus provide more natural explanations for trust estimates than
an approach that is purely heuristic. Evaluating this potential benefit would require
additional human study, which we defer to future work.
Endnote
1From the Turkish word that brings together the concepts of trust and reliance.
Appendix
Data
We provide the data content in the following URL: “http://tinyurl.com/q59joom”. In the
data folder there are two sub folders: (1) Email_Documents and (2) Processed_Data. In the
Email_Documents folder, there are 14 files. Each file represents email exchanges between
Kimberly and one of her colleague at Enron. In the Processed_Data folder, there are 15
files. Each file represents data in the format given in Table 3. Each files contains expe-
riences observed by the truster from the trustee and corresponding trust values of the
truster toward the trustee as assigned by subjects. There are four kinds of processed data
files.
• Processed_Data_Emails_Experiences_Trust_Values file contains experiences
obtained from emails between senders and receivers and corresponding trust value
assigned by subjects.
• Processed_Data_Game_Experiences_Trust_Values file contains experiences obtained
from chats exchanged between subjects during their game play and corresponding
trust value assigned by subjects
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• Processed_Data_Emails_Windows_Size_1-12_Trust_Values files contain experiences
based on different window sizes (from 1 to 12) and corresponding trust values
assigned by subjects. The maximum window size considered is 12 since we mention
in Section ‘Results’ that increasing the window size beyond 12 does not improved the
result (reduce the MAE).
• Processed_Data_Emails_Experiences_Strength_Trust_Values file contains experi-
ences strength computed from emails based on ranks of features provided in Table 6
and corresponding trust values assigned by subjects.
Questionnaires
We asked the following questions to subjects to collect their perceived importance about
features discussed in Section ‘Considering strength’.
Commissive over directive. To assess whether a commissive carry a greater weight
than a directive, we asked subjects the following question (choice 1 indicates a directive
whereas choice 2 indicates a commissive).
• According to you which is more important?
– 1. Please review the attached agreement for the Big Sandy Interconnect.
– 2. I will review the attached agreement for the Big Sandy Interconnect.
– 3. 1 and 2 are equal
Debtor’s type. To assess if a single debtor type carry a greater weight than multiple
debtors, we asked subjects the following questions.
• According to you which is more important?
– 1. We will follow up with Mike to make sure he understands how the numbers
were derived.
– 2. I will follow up with Mike to make sure he understands how the numbers were
derived.
– 3. 1 and 2 are equal
• According to you which is more important?
– 1. SENDER: Kimberly; RECEIVER: Steven, Teb, Mark, Mansoor, Earl, Stephen,
Robert, Jan, Mark, Mansoor, Earl, Stephen, Robert, Jan; Please review the
attached work order for the tap and side valve for the new Agave interconnect.
– 2. SENDER: Kimberly; RECEIVER: Steven; Please review the attached work order
for the tap and side valve for the new Agave interconnect.
– 3. 1 and 2 are equal
Creditor’s type To assess whether multiple debtors carry a greater weight than a single
creditor, we asked subjects the following question (Choice 1
• According to you which is more important?
– 1. SENDER: Kimberly; RECEIVER: Lorraine, Lohman, Michelle, Mark, Paul;
Would you please send me your bullets by the end of today (before we leave for
the Cirque show).
– 2. SENDER: Kimberly; RECEIVER: Lorraine; Would you please send me your
bullets by the end of today (before we leave for the Cirque show).
– 3. 1 and 2 are equal
• According to you which is more important?
– 1. SENDER: Michelle; RECEIVER: Rich Cc: Earl; Kimberly; I will speak to Mark
Kraus (EOG Commercial) to recap, in case he was not aware of the results.
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– 2. SENDER: Michelle; RECEIVER: Rich, Earl, Kimberly; I will speak to Mark
Kraus (EOG Commercial) to recap, in case he was not aware of the results.
– 3. SENDER: Michelle, RECEIVER: Rich; I will speak to Mark Kraus (EOG
Commercial) to recap, in case he was not aware of the results
– 3. 1 and 2 are equal
– 4. 2 and 3 are equal
– 5. 1 and 3 are equal
Modal verbs. To assess which modal verb convey high confidence over others, we asked
subjects the following question.
1 Rank the following sentences in a order that ranges over a scale of 1 to 8 where 1
indicates the lowest and 8
– 1. I would call you on Monday to discuss so we can give it to Danny quickly
[Assign Rank: 1–8].
– 2. I must call you onMonday to discuss so we can give it to Danny quickly [Assign
Rank: 1–8].
– 3. I can call you on Monday to discuss so we can give it to Danny quickly [Assign
Rank: 1–8].
– 4. I will call you on Monday to discuss so we can give it to Danny quickly [Assign
Rank: 1–8].
– 5. I could call you onMonday to discuss so we can give it to Danny quickly [Assign
Rank: 1–8].
– 6. I should call you on Monday to discuss so we can give it to Danny quickly
[Assign Rank: 1–8].
– 7. I may call you onMonday to discuss so we can give it to Danny quickly [Assign
Rank: 1–8].
– 8. I shall call you onMonday to discuss so we can give it to Danny quickly [Assign
Rank: 1–8].
Deadlines. To assess if noun phrases with deadlines may convey more importance than
noun phrases without deadlines we asked subjects the following questions
• According to you which is more important?
– 1. Would you please send me your bullets by the end of today?
– 2. Would you please send me your bullets?
– 3. 1 and 2 are equal
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